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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a model that is suitable to study the diffusion of
new and dominant multi-generation technologies. Examples are computer operat-
ing systems, mobile phone standards, video game consoles. Our model incorporates
three new features that are not included in related models. First, we add the ability
of a firm to transfer users of its old technologies to the new generations, what we
call firms’ alpha. Second, we add competitive relations between market technolo-
gies. Third, the launch strategies diagnosed by our model cover, as special cases,
the now or never strategies and hence it is suitable to study intermediate launch
strategies.
We state the relationship of our model to previous research both in terms of
the model formulation and in terms of some of its analytical solutions. Specifically,
the model may reduce to the Bass or the Norton and Bass models. Regarding the
analytical solutions, we find that the launch never strategy arise when there are
late product introductions by competitors, when a firm’s alpha is very low, or when
the competition is intense while the launch now strategy arise only when a firm’s
alpha is zero.
In addition, we evaluate different launch strategies and the optimality of launch
timings in two detailed case studies on the video game systems market. We study
the portable systems (PS) and the video game consoles (VGC) industry. Hence,
we formulate our model for two market contexts, the duopolistic structure of the
PS case and the triopolistic market of the VGC case. We present several insights
from our analysis and we find interesting explanations for the pacing strategy in
this market, for which we also provide a historical perspective.
Finally, we find that the appropriate timing of a new technology depends heavily
on both the firms’ alphas and on the competitive positioning of their products. In
addition, we argue that the strategic interaction of firms may lead to very different
sales outcomes depending on the competitive positioning of their products. In the
VGC case we find that the Nintendo Wii was launched at an appropriate moment
while the Sony PS3 perhaps should have never been launched.
KEYWORDS: MULTI-GENERATION DIFFUSION MODELS, LAUNCH TIMING, VIDEO-GAME INDUSTRY
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1 Introduction
In a well-known study on the behavior of chimpanzees Jane Goodall writes:
“In 1963 Goliath, a powerful and aggressive male in his prime (perhaps
about 25 years of age) was the alpha male. He had a spectacular charging
display during which he covered the ground very fast indeed, dragging and
occasionally hurling branches. Early in 1964, however, Goliath was displaced
from his top-ranking position in the community by an older and much less
robust male, Mike... Unlike Goliath, who had maintained a very high ranking
position for several years after losing his alpha rank, Mike dropped rapidly to a
low position in the hierarchy... In chimpanzee society, dominance is something
of a conundrum. The usual interpretation of the phenomenon is that it enables
a high-ranking individual to have prior access to desirable foods, females, or
resting places.” (van Lawick-Goodall, 1973)
We believe that Goodall’s description of dominance in the chimpanzee society di-
rectly applies to new technologies and their markets. Specifically, markets of new
technologies formed by a few firms and products and by a single or a few dominant
alpha technologies are analogous to the few chimpanzee males that fight for the
alpha rank. Examples of products in this type of industries are operating systems,
mobile phone standards, video game consoles, smart phones, and so on.
Many technology firms, like Apple or Microsoft, launch several versions of their
products, what we know as product generations. Each time a new generation
product is introduced to the market some or many of the users of the old generations
switch to the new one, at the same time new users may adopt the new generation
product while other users may switch from one firms products to another firms
products after a new introduction. That is, each product generation cannibalizes
its previous generation and each firm has a different capacity of transferring the
users of the old technology to the new one. For example, we know that Apple
has been very successful transferring the users of its old technologies to the new
ones. Linux, even though it is a smaller player, is a second example of a technology
with a high alpha. In contrast, it was widely documented how Microsoft users were
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hesitant to switch from Windows XP to Windows Vista. Some Windows users
stickied to Windows XP while others switched to alternative operating systems. In
this paper we will refer to the firms capacity of cannibalizing and transferring users
of old technologies to new ones as the firm’s alpha. In our example, Apple would
be the player with a high alpha.
In this paper we extend the Norton and Bass (1987) model by incorporating
three new elements that have not been addressed simultaneously in previous lit-
erature. These are the firm’s ability of transferring its users to new technologies
(the firm’s alpha), the competitive interaction between firms in the market, and
a new solution to the timing of new technologies. Our model is suitable to study
the timing of new generation products in industries that are characterized by a
relatively slow pace of introductions and a few firms launching new technologies.
In addition, we test our model empirically under different settings and based on
the new model we provide insights into the launch-timing strategies and into the
optimality of launch timings.
Previous empirical literature has addressed the diffusion of new multi-generation
technologies, like Norton and Bass (1987), Kim and Lee (2005), Danaher et al.
(2001) and Kim et al. (2000), but they do not cover the topic of introduction timing.
Two exceptions are Norton and Bass (1987) and Mahajan and Muller (1996). These
last authors introduce the timing of new products into their models and tested
them empirically. However, both the Norton and Bass (1987) and the Mahajan
and Muller (1996) models suggest to launch new technology either now or never.
Other analytical studies have addressed specifically the timing of new technologies,
like Wilson and Norton (1989), Joshi et al. (2009), Bayus et al. (1997), Souza et al.
(2004) and Morgan et al. (2001), but these later authors models have not been
tested empirically and in most cases their models are suitable for industries with a
fast pace of technology introductions, an exception being Joshi et al. (2009). More
importantly, these studies do not incorporate the three new elements we address
simultaneously.
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present our literature review.
In Section 3 we present our model for the duopoly and triopoly case (sections
3.1 and 3.2, respectively), we discuss its relationship to previous models (section
3.3) and the analytical properties that distinguish it from previous models (section
3.4). In Section 4 we introduce the market context and our data. In Section 5
we motivate the model assumptions and the estimation procedure. In Section 6
we discuss the estimation results. In the next two sections we use our model to
study the industry. In Section 7 we study the portable system market and we give
insights about different launch strategies. Next, in Section 8, we study the main
video game console market, composed of Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo, and we
focus our analysis in the latest console race. We further provide insights into how
different introduction timings may be optimal. Finally, in Section 9 we present our
discussion and conclusions.
2 Literature Review
To our knowledge, Wilson and Norton (1989) and Mahajan and Muller (1996)
are the two key studies concerned with the question of when it is optimal for a
monopoly to launch multi-generation products. According to Wilson and Norton
(1989) there are three critical issues which affect the optimal introduction time of a
new generation. These are the interrelationship of sales of the two products, their
profit margins and the planning horizon. Surprisingly, their model provides two
optimal solutions regardless of the relevance of these factors. They conclude that
different generations of a product should be introduced either all at the same time
or sequentially and not overlapping. In a similar vein, Mahajan and Muller (1996)
conclude that a new generation should be introduced as soon as it is available (if its
market potential is larger than the preceding one) or it should be delayed to a much
later stage, that is, to the maturity of the previous generation. Their findings seem
special cases of the solutions proposed by Kamien and Schwartz (1972). Kamien
and Schwartz (1972) suggest to never launch a technology only under extreme
competition and to launch now only if the firm needs to take advantage of a profit
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stream that would otherwise be smaller once competitors come in.
More recently, Joshi et al. (2009) study the problem of product launch timings
across different markets. They characterize situations, depending on social influ-
ence, where it is optimal to launch before maturity or after the maturity of the first
generation product. However, Joshi et al. (2009) do not incorporate competition
and their model is only useful to study the interaction of products across markets
(same product in two geographies, for example). Souza et al. (2004) study the
new product introduction strategy and its relation to industry clock speed. They
provide analytical evidence that a time-pacing strategy (launching products every
n time periods) performs relatively well compared to the optimal strategy. Their
model applies to settings with a high frequency of product introductions. The
studies of Morgan et al. (2001) and Bayus et al. (1997) analyze how the trade-offs
between quality or product performance (measured by development costs) inter-
act with the introduction timing decision. In contrast, we study the relationship
between cannibalization and competition with the introduction timing decisions.
The literature on multi-generation products is very extensive. Padmanabhan
and Bass (1993) and Bayus (1992) propose models to price successive generations
of products, Danaher et al. (2001) analyze the relation between the marketing mix
and diffusion of multi-generation products, Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) exam-
ine the diffusion of complementary innovations, Kim et al. (2001), Chatterjee and
Eliashberg (1990), Kim and Srinivasan (2001), Jun and Park (1999), Vakratsas
et al. (2002) and Bayus (1991) study how and when consumers decide to upgrade
to improved products’ versions. Islam and Meade (2000), Islam and Meade (1997)
and Olson and Joi (1985) propose models for diffusion and replacement of products,
while Purohit (1994), Robertson et al. (1995) and Prasad et al. (2004) analyze the
introduction strategies of multi-generations products or the release of single prod-
ucts in multiple channels. Finally, Kim et al. (2000), Kim and Lee (2005), Peterson
and Mahajan (1978) and Islam and Meade (1997) present alternative diffusion mod-
els for successive generations of products.
Our contributions to this literature are as follows. First, we propose a model that
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incorporates competition and cannibalization (firm’s alpha) based on a duopolistic
and triopolistic market. Second, our model parameters are simple to estimate
or to calibrate with secondary quantitative or qualitative information and it is
possible to find intermediate solutions to the introduction timing problem. Third,
we provide two detailed case studies about the timing of game systems that are not
documented in the literature. Finally, we present new insights regarding different
launch strategies and the optimality of timing decisions.
Next we briefly discuss the Norton and Bass Model (NBM) as it is our departing
point and it is essential in our model development.
2.1 The Norton and Bass Model
In this paper we overcome three limitations of the NBM model that have not been
jointly addressed in previous research. Denote S1(τ1, τ2) as the first generation
sales, S2(τ1, τ2) as the second generation sales and denote τ1 and τ2 as the launch
moment of these generations, respectively. The first limitation is that ∂(S1(τ1, τ2)+
S2(τ1, τ2))/∂τ2 = 0 is obtained when τ2 = 0 or when τ2 =∞. Sg(τ1, τ2) are the sales
of generation g given the introduction timings of the first and second generation
products, τ1 and τ2, respectively. Therefore, the basic Norton and Bass (1987)
model is not helpful to derive an intermediate optimal introduction timing apart of
these two solutions. The second limitation is that it assumes that all the sales of
the previous generation are captured by the second generation. Finally, the NBM
does not consider the diffusion of competing products.
In the NBM cumulative sales are proportional to the cumulative distribution
function of the adoption rate F (t) and the market potential m. When a second
generation is introduced, substitution and adoption effects should be added to the
previous equation. For the case of two generations, Norton and Bass posit that the
first generation cumulative sales follow
S1(τ1, τ2) = m1F1(τ1)[1− F2(τ2)], for t > 0, (1)
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and that the second generation follows
S2(τ1, τ2) = F2(τ2)[m2 + F1(τ1)m1], for t > τ2 (2)
where we use Sg(τ1, τ2) to refer to the vector [Sg(τ1, τ2; t = 0), . . . , Sg(τ1, τ2; t = Tp)]
and S1(τ1, τ2; t) is equal to m1F1(τ1; t)[1 − F2(τ2; t)] while S2(τ1, τ2; t) is equal to
F2(τ2; t)[m2+F1(τ1; t)m1]. The introduction date of the first generation (g = 1) is τ1
and the introduction date of the second generation (g = 2) is τ2. Tp is the planning
horizon, which is set as ∞ in Norton and Bass (1987). Fi(τi; t) is the cumulative
sales function of generation g defined as Fg(τg; t) = [1− e
−bi(t−τg)/1 + aie
−bg(t−τg)]
for t > τg and ag=qg/pg and bg = pg + qg, g = 1, 2. We use Fg(τg) to refer to
the vector [Fg(τg; t = 0), . . . , Fg(τg; t = Tp)]. Slightly stricter notation would use
Fg(τg; t, θ) where θ = (pg, qg,mg) but we use the former as we focus on the timing
parameters in this study. Note that in the Norton and Bass (1987) τ1 is assumed
to be fixed at some value (possibly at t = 0) and they do not focus on its value.
The equations of the NBM posit that after the second generation is introduced
at time τ2, the first generation’s cumulative sales S1(τ1, τ2) become proportional to
its cumulative adoption function F1(τ1), its market potential m1, and the sales not
captured by the second generation [1 − F2(τ2)] after τ2. The sales of the second
generation S2(τ1, τ2) are proportional to their own market potential m2 and to the
cumulative sales of the first generation F1(τ1)m1 after τ2.
If the NBM equation (1) would contain only the term m1F1(τ1), then the sales
S1(τ1, τ2) will be equivalent to the model of Bass (1969). However, in the Norton
and Bass (1987) model a fraction F2(τ2) of m1F1(τ1) is captured by the second
generation. Consequently, there is a moment in time when F2(τ2) will become 1
and all of the first generation sales are transferred to the second generation and
the last element of S1(τ1, τ2) becomes 0. At the same time S2(τ1, τ2) = m2F2(τ2)+
F2(τ2)F1(τ1)m1 and therefore, m1 +m2 is the last element of the vector S2(τ1, τ2),
given in equation (2).
In the next section we present a model that is a generalized version of the NBM
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and we believe this new general model overcomes all the three limitations of the
NBM.
3 A Multi-Product Diffusion Model with Competition
This section is divided in four subsections. In the first (subsection 3.1) we extend
the NBM to the duopoly case and in the second (subsection 3.2) we extend the
model to the triopoly case. Both extensions are based on the same assumptions
and we present the duopoly case first for ease of exposition. In the third section we
present the relationship of our model to previous models proposed in the literature
(section 3.3). Finally, in the fourth (subsection 3.4) we present the intuition and
the analytical properties that make our specification suitable to optimize and study
the launch timing of new dominant technologies.
3.1 Duopoly Multi-Generation Model
In order to expand the Norton and Bass (1987) model and add a second firm or
a second competing product, we should make assumptions about the relationship
between the firms’ products. Here we make the assumption that the relationship
between the two generations products of a firm are related in a very similar but
more flexible way than in the NBM, and that is where the alpha parameter comes in.
Additionally, we will assume that the sales that go from one product to a competi-
tor’s version are proportional to the cumulative sales function of the competitor’s
products.
Formally, if the market is composed of two firms s and n, the cumulative sales
of firm s are
Ss1(τ
s
1 , τ
s
2 |τ
n
1 , τ
n
2 ) = S˜
s
1(τ
s
1 , τ
s
2 )[1 − φ
sn
11F
n
1 (τ
n
1 )][1− φ
sn
12F
n
2 (τ
n
2 )] (3)
and
Ss2(τ
s
1 , τ
s
2 |τ
n
1 , τ
n
2 ) = S˜
s
2(τ
s
1 , τ
s
2 )[1 − φ
sn
21F
n
1 (τ
n
1 )][1− φ
sn
22F
n
2 (τ
n
2 )] (4)
8
The cumulative sales of firm n are
Sn1 (τ
n
1 , τ
n
2 |τ
s
1 , τ
s
2 ) = S˜
n
1 (τ
n
1 , τ
n
2 )[1 + φ
ns
11F
s
1 (τ
s
1 )][1 + φ
ns
12F
s
2 (τ
s
2 )] (5)
and
Sn2 (τ
n
1 , τ
n
2 |τ
s
1 , τ
s
2 ) = S˜
n
2 (τ
n
1 , τ
n
2 )[1 + φ
ns
21F
s
1 (τ
s
1 )][1 + φ
ns
22F
s
2 (τ
s
2 )] (6)
where S˜i1 and S˜
i
2 are defined as
S˜i1(τ
i
1, τ
i
2) = m
j
1F
i
1(τ
i
1)[1 − αiF
i
2(τ
i
2)] for i = n or s (7)
and
˜
Sj2(τ
i
1, τ
i
2) = F
i
2(τ
i
2)[m
i
2 + αiF
i
1(τ
i
1)m
i
1] for i = n or s (8)
Finally we have that
F ig(τ
i
g; t) = [1− e
−big(t−τ
i
g)/1 + aige
−big(t−τ
i
g)]× I(τ ig ≥ t) for t > 0 (9)
where Sig(τ
i
1, τ
i
2|τ
s
1 , τ
s
2 ) represent the sales of generation g of firm i achieved by
launching its first and second generation products at τ i1 and τ
i
2 and given the com-
peting firm s launched its products at τ s1 and τ
s
2 ; a
i
g = q
i
g/p
i
g and b
i
g = p
i
g + q
i
g
and I(τ ig > t) is an indicator function that equals 1 when the introduction time
of generation g of firm i, τ ig, is larger than or equal to t and zero otherwise. The
term φijgk refers to the substitution (or loyalty) parameter between the generation
g of firm i and the generation k of firm j. We use F ig(τ
i
g) to represent the vector
[F ig(τ
i
g; t = 0), . . . , F
i
g(τ
i
g; t = Tp)]. Again, stricter notation would use F
i
g(τ
i
g; t, θ)
where θ is a vector that collects all other parameters in the model. The parameters
pig and q
i
g are the innovation and imitation parameters of generation g and firm i,
respectively, g = 1, 2 and i = n, s.
We may refer occasionally to φ as the vector (φ1, . . . , φN ) where N is the num-
ber of products and to α as the vector (α1, . . . , αI) where I is the number of firms.
Equations 3 to 9 allow for a wide variety of relationships given the sign and size
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of what we call the loyalty parameters or φ and the values of the the alpha canni-
balization parameters (α). The role of the α parameter is to relax the assumption
of the NBM that all the sales of the first generation of a firm are transferred to
the second generation. Note that the last elements of the vector in
˜
Sj2(τ
i
1, τ
i
2) will
be equal to mi2 + αm
i
1 and the last element of S˜
i
1(τ
i
1, τ
i
2) is equal to m
j
1 − αm
j
1.
Therefore α can be interpreted as the proportion of sales that the first generation
transfers to the next when t = Tp and Tp is of course sufficiently long.
In Figure 1 we sketch the relationship between product generations in the
duopoly model. Basically, there is substitution between all products but substi-
tution starts at different points in time. The first generation is launched at t = 0
and it is the only product in the market up to t = T1. At this moment the first
generation of the second firm is launched and the substitution between these two
products (represented by the blank continuous line) starts too. The rest of the
products are launched at time t = T2 and t = T3 and the substitution between
them and the products launched before them start at these times. Note that the
model allows for the possibility of never launching a product if we set its launch
date at t = Tp. This figure represents a hypothetical case of launch dates but we
can evaluate any launch-timing in the model. For example, we could evaluate the
result of launching the products in reverse order or in any order. In practice the
second generation arrives after the first one, but any other combination is allowed.
Finally, note that there is only one single arrow between the products in the figure.
That is, we assume symmetric competitive parameters. If the relationship between
products is not symmetric then we would need two arrows connecting any pair of
products in Figure 1.
Next we present the triopoly model and at the end of next section we discuss
how both the duopoly and the triopoly models are related to previous research.
3.2 Triopoly Multi-Generation Model
In this section we extend the duopoly model and set the sales equations for firms
s, n and x and we hold the assumption that each firm sells two generations of the
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same product.
The cumulative sales equations for firm x are:
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The cumulative sales equations for firm s are:
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And, the cumulative sales equations for firm n are:
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where S˜i1 and S˜
i
2 are defined as
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and
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−big(t−τ
i
g)]× I(τ ig ≥ t) for t > 0 (18)
where aig = q
i
g/p
i
g and b
i
g = p
i
g+q
i
g and I(τ
i
g > t) is an indicator function that equals
1 when the introduction time of generation g of firm i, τ ig, is larger than or equal to
t and zero otherwise. The term φijgk is the competitive parameter that relates the
generation g of firm i with the generation k of firm j. The parameters pig and q
i
g
are the innovation and imitation parameters of generation g, respectively, g = 1, 2.
The specification of (10) to (18) is similar to the duopoly case but now we allow
for substitution between three market players x, s, and n and each of their products.
The duopoly model consists of four launch-timing parameters, eight φ parameters,
two α parameters, four p and q parameters and four m parameters. That is in total
26 parameters in four equations. The triopoly model consists of 45 parameters (six
τ , 24 φ, six p and q, three α and six m) in six equations. In the estimation section
5 we describe how we calibrate both models and the parameter restrictions and
assumptions we use. Next we describe the relationship of our model with previous
models.
3.3 Links with Other Models
In Figure 2 we summarize the relationship of this general NBM with previous models
based on different parameter configurations. It is useful to see the nodes at the top
of the figure as possible cases for each firm in our model. We start with the left node.
If the α parameter, in one of the firm’s equations, is equal to zero then there exists
no cannibalization between a specific firm generations and the diffusion of each of
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its generations follows an independent Bass Model. However, in this case if some
of the φ parameters are different from zero then we have independent Bass Models
but we add inter-generation competition (or what is the same as between firms
competition); otherwise they follow independent Bass models. On the right hand
side of the figure we see the case when the α parameter is set to 1 and this means
that the relationship of generations within firms follows the NBM specification.
As in the previous node the φ parameters may add inter-generation competition
between firms (note that is not within the same firm). Finally, in the central node
we have the case when α is different from both 0 and 1. In this last case, the
model allows cannibalization within a firm’s generations but the cannibalization is
different from the NBM. Therefore we call this a second type of cannibalization.
As before, for this node the φ parameters may add inter-generation competition
between firms.
At the bottom of Figure 2 we give three boxes representing firms and the arrows
correspond to two hypothetical specifications (case 1 and 2) for each firm. In the
first case, firm 1 products follow a NBM with second type of cannibalization, firm
2 products follow independent Bass Models while firm 3 products follow the NBM.
That is, in this case the only firm facing the effects of competition is firm 2. In
the second case we set a different combination and our intention is to illustrate
that the model parameters allow a diverse set of diffusion patters among firms and
products. A similar specification for the NBM is possible when either the p or q of
any of the generations is equal to 0. Note that each firm launches two generations
of products within the planning horizon but the triopoly model may reduce to the
duopoly model in case a firm sets the launch date at the end of the planning horizon
(what we refer as Tp) for its two generations. A different specification happens when
each firm launches a single product by setting one of its generations launch-timing
equal to Tp. Hence, our model is flexible enough to allow different substitution
patterns between firms’ products and within firm generations. At the same time
the triopoly case might reduce to different number of firms or products depending
on the parameter values.
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3.4 Why Our Model Works
In this subsection we present the intuition of why our model is useful to find inter-
mediates dates rather than τ = 0 or τ =∞ solutions of the NBM. The intermediate
solutions are possible due to the trade-off between competitive interaction between
products and the cannibalization within a firm’s generations. For example, if the
firm n launches a product at time τc and this product might enhance/deter the sales
of one of the products of firm s after this time. Then the firm s has the incentive to
advance/postpone the launch of its product relative to the launch of the competing
product. In this way, firm s could maximize/minimize the positive/negative effects
of competition. That is, the timing decision depends on the sign and size of the
effect of firm’s n product on the sales of firm’s s products. In addition, there is
a trade-off between maximizing or minimizing the effect of competition and the
effects on firm s previous generation product. Therefore, by launching the second
generation sooner the previous generation might lose sales to the second generation
earlier in time. In summary, the optimization of the competitive effects and the
own cannibalization effects is possible in our specification while it is not possible
to optimize them in the NBM.
Here we present a simplified version of the duopoly model and assume that one
of the competing firms launches only one product at τc while the second firm s
sells two products and these are launched at τ1 and τ2. We further assume that
the competitive effects are measured by the coefficients φ1 and φ2. Formally, the
equations of firm s are
Ss1(τ1, τ2|τc) = m1F
s
1 (τ1)[1− αsF
s
2 (τ2)][1 − φ1F
c
1 (τc)], for t > 0, (19)
and
Ss2(τ1, τ2|τc) = F
s
2 (τ2)[m2 + αsF
s
1 (τ1)m1][1− φ2F
c
1 (τc)], for t > τ2 (20)
That is, the first and second generation sales of firm s, Ss1(τ1, τ2|τc) and S
s
2(τ1, τ2|τc),
are now related to the competing product by the loyalty parameters φ1 and φ2. It
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is easy to show that the sales gained or lost by adding competition to the NBM
(with cannibalization of type 2) are
∆s =
[
αs(φ2 − φ1)m1F
s
1 (τ1)F
s
2 (τ2)+
φ1m1F
s
1 (τ1) + φ2m2F
s
2 (τ2)
]
F c1 (τc), for t ≥ τc (21)
∆s is the sales change due to the introduction of a competing product and it
depends on the parameters αs, φ1 and φ2 and on the introduction timings τ1 and
τ2 relative to τc. The terms φ1m1F
s
1 (τ1) and φ2m2F
s
2 (τ2) measure the share of each
product of firm s that might be transferred/received to/from a competing product
and the shares are φ1 and φ2. The term αs(φ2 − φ1)m1F
s
1 (τ1)F
s
2 (τ2) reflects the
share of the cannibalized sales that might be transferred to a competing product
and this share is αs × (φ2 − φ1). Note that αs is the share transferred between
generations of the firm s while αs × (φ2 − φ1) is the share that might be transfer
to a competing product. If αs = 0 this implies no cannibalization and we are back
to the NBM specification with competition. Finally, all terms belonging to firm s
interact with the diffusion of the competing product F c1 (τc) after τc. This last term
exists only after t > τc and hence firm s decision should take into account that after
time τc their products will gain or lose some share to the competing product. Note
that equation (21) uses a simplified version of the duopoly model and that in our
application below we use the complete duopoly and triopoly model.
The following lemmas cover a few interesting optimal timing scenarios. We
include them because they illustrate some extreme cases where the launch now
or never strategy may be valid and they illustrate the flexibility of our model
specification.
Lemma 1 The optimal introduction timing of both the first and second generation
products is equal to zero when there is no cannibalization (αs = 0), when the φ1 < 0
and φ2 < 0 and there is one competitive introduction at τc.
From (21) it follows that if αs = 0, one has ∆s = −(φ1m1F
s
1 (τ1)+φ2m2F
s
2 (τ2))F
c
1 (τc).
It is clear that both products should be introduced at t = 0 given that they face
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competition after τc, that is, the earlier they are both introduced, the better. Hence,
in the case of no cannibalization with competition the option of launch now is the
optimal solution. If there is no competition and cannibalization we are back to the
solutions of the Norton and Bass model. This lemma is in line with Kamien and
Schwartz (1972).
Lemma 2 The optimal introduction timing of the first and second generation prod-
ucts (τ1 and τ2) are equal to τc when there is no cannibalization (αs = 0), when the
φ1 > 0 or the φ2 > 0, respectively, and when a competitive introduction happens at
τc.
Introducing at time τc produces a positive ∆s and it is clear that a firm should
choose a time closer to τc. If both products are launched before τc the sales stream is
smaller between τ1 and τc for the first generation, and they are smaller between time
τ2 and τc for the second generation. On the other hand, if they are launched after
τc they do not benefit from competition for τ1 − τc or τ2 − τc periods, respectively.
This lemma implies that imitation may be optimal under certain conditions. As
before, the strategy of launch never is discarded because there are positive returns
to launch at dates closer to competitors. This lemma may be modified easily to the
situation where imitation is optimal for only one generation, for example if φ1 = 0
and φ2 > 0. In our application below we will conduct a numerical exercise (in
section 7.2) where this lemma is at work.
Lemma 3 It is optimal to never launch the second generation when Ss2(τ1, τ2|τc)
+∆s < 0.
When the returns on introducing the new product ∆s outweigh the unit sales of
Ss2(τ1, τ2|τc) then it is optimal not to introduce it. Hence, the launch never strategy
arises when there is stiff competition as in Kamien and Schwartz (1972). In our
case study (section 8.2) we evaluate the parameter space that leads to this lemma.
There are other interesting possibilities of intermediate launch-timings when
there is cannibalization and competition either for the first or second generation
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given different values for the φ1, φ2 and α parameters. In our case studies we
explore numerically other possibilities for the α parameter and the optimal timing
of products and explore the parameter space that may lead to any of these lemmas
or to the launch now or never strategy.
4 The Video Game Hardware Market
The hardware market for video games can be split in two sub-markets: hardware
for portable systems (PS) and hardware for video game consoles (VGC). In this
paper we treat these markets to be independent of each other. Indeed, most press
articles indicate that the markets of PS and VGC are independent. See for ex-
ample The Herald (2005), Financial Times (2004), The Economist (2004) and The
Washington Post (2008). The reader may be familiar with the video game console
wars between Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo (BusinessWeek, 2008b; The Washing-
ton Post, 2006). At the moment (September 2009) these three companies are the
main market players in the hardware market. Microsoft does not sell any PS while
the three companies sell competing video game consoles. Sega stopped producing
game consoles in 2001 (San Francisco Chronicle, 2001) and Apple and Microsoft
are seen as potential new competitors of Sony and Nintendo in the PS market.
(BusinessWeek, 2008a; Wall Street Journal, 2006).
4.1 Some Basic Figures
In Table 1 we report the release dates of the main PS hardware since 1998 for three
main markets: North America, Japan and Europe. The release dates for PS seem
almost arbitrary and they occur in months that range from February to December
for all three regions. However, when we look at the time between releases within
companies we discover a different pattern. Table 2 shows an average of two-year
intervals between releases.
In Table 3 we report the release dates on all major VGC since 1987. Clearly,
the VGC market is quite different from the PS market. The release dates in North
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America are mainly chosen to be close to November while in Japan and Europe
most releases occur also in other months of the last quarter of the year. If we
look at Table 4 we can see that there is an additional regularity around the VGC
releases. They occur approximately every five years. Only the Sony PS3 took more
than 6 years to be released and this was due to a delay in the development of the
blu-ray technology added to the PS3. See The New York Times (2006) for more
details on this story.
In Table 5 and Table 6 we report the estimates of single-generation Bass models
for PS and VGC. Portable systems have very similar innovation parameters (p)
but quite different imitation parameters (q). We computed simple statistics on the
Bass models and in most cases they fit the data quite well. We discuss more details
on our data next.
4.2 Data and Data Cleaning
Our data for the duopoly and triopoly NBM models consists of weekly time series
of sales at the USA for the last two PS of Nintendo and Sony and the last two
generations of consoles released by Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo. The portable
systems are the Nintendo DS, the Nintendo DS Lite, the Sony PlayStation Portable
(PSP) and the Sony PSP Slim. The video game consoles are the Microsoft Xbox,
Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony PS2, Sony PS3, Nintendo GameCube and Nintendo
Wii. In addition, we obtained the corresponding release dates for all products from
different news sources and for all cases the release dates matched the date of the
first week that we observed in our data. We used a script to download our data
from www.vgchartz.com and the site admins authorized us to use their data. Our
data for all systems cover the period since their release week up to January 2009.
That is, our data covers a period of almost 9 years and 10 systems.
Before we plug our data into the estimation routines we control for indirect net-
work effects, seasonality and price. It has been documented that indirect network
effects might play a role in the video game market (see for example, Chintagunta
et al. (2009), Clements and Ohashi (2005) or Shankar and Bayus (2003)). Fur-
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thermore, Binken and Stremersch (2009) show that it is mainly super star software
what drives indirect network effects in the video game systems market. Therefore,
in this paper we use a simplified version of the model proposed by Binken and
Stremersch (2009) to clean our data from indirect network effects and price. We
use the following equation
Yt = αYt−1 +
∑
j=1...52
βjWDj +
∑
l=t...t−L
λlPCDl +
∑
k=t...t−K
δkSSIk + ǫt (22)
where Yt are the system sales at week t; WDj refers to the week j dummies; PCDl
is the price cut dummies with L total lags and it indicates the week when prices
were cut; SSIk is the total number of super star software introduced at week k.
To create the independent variables in equation (22) we collected release dates
and quality ratings on the most popular video games for the systems in our sample.
For each system we found approximately 120 video games to construct the SSI
variable. In total we collected data for 1200 video games. These data come from
many different online sources. Furthermore, we use many different news services to
find the price cut timing for all consoles in our sample. We estimated equation (22)
for each console in our sample and then we subtracted the terms
∑
k=t...t−K δkSSIk
and
∑
l=t...t−L λlPCDl from the consoles sales Yt only if they are significant. We
report in Table 7 the sales percentage that indirect network effects represent for
each console and the number of lags for the SSIk variable that we used. We chose
the number of lags in the same way as Binken and Stremersch (2009).
Interestingly, despite our model is a much simpler version of that of Binken and
Stremersch (2009) we find that indirect network effects represent on average a 13%
of the consoles sales while Binken and Stremersch (2009) found that percentage to
be 14%. That is, our results confirm their findings. In contrast, we use weekly
data, they use monthly, and we find that on average the number of lags correspond
to approximately 7 weeks (that is less than 2 months) while they report significant
lags up to 5 months. In terms of weeks 5 months represent 20 weeks. We tested
lag numbers up to 20 weeks but we did not find significant effects further than 14
19
weeks (see Table 7). Note that the number of lags in the Table should be read with
caution because not all lags were found significant and as Binken and Stremersch
(2009) we include the last non significant lag to avoid bias. An additional difference
is that we estimate the equation (22) separately for each system while they use a
panel approach and that their SSI variable is monthly while we trace software
introduction per week. Our guess is that they use a panel approach because they
consider much shorter time series and the panel approach helped them to identify
their model parameters. However, they warn about considerable heterogeneity of
the network effects and their result of 14% is therefore close to an average of network
effects across systems. Our long time series of weekly data allows us estimate the
model for each system and the fit we achieve is very good for all systems (R2 close to
0.80). A final difference in our approach is that we use the 120 most popular video
games per system while they use on average the 10 superstar software video games
per system. We estimated a second version of the system models by including only
the highly rated video games (the superstars), as do Binken and Stremersch (2009),
in the SSI variable. Binken and Stremersch (2009) do not report the percentile
they use as a selection heuristic and we selected the video games with a quality
rating in the top 25 percentile. In this case, the average network effects jumps up
to 15%, while it is also close to their reported number. That is, higher quality video
games might have higher network effects although the difference between 13% and
15% can hardly be considered as significant.
The resulting adjusted series without network and price effects still needs to be
cleaned from seasonality and for this latter purpose we use the TRAMO/SEATS
methodology (Gomez and Maravall, 2001, chap. 8). We further control for all
major holidays in the USA and for Easter.
In sum, the series we plug in our estimation routine are the seasonally adjusted
series without indirect network and price effects. We use this series because the
competitive parameters on our model could pick up the correlation caused by indi-
rect network effects, price and seasonality if we do not control for them.
Our data covers 10 gaming systems and therefore we estimated 20 models (10
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for the network effects and 10 for the seasonal adjustment). We do not report
these results but they are available from the authors upon request. In addition,
we estimate both the duopoly and triopoly models with the original data and the
parameter estimates remain very similar. However, the fit is better when we use
the clean data.
5 Estimation and Parameter Assumptions
We use the systems NLS estimator described in Cameron and Trivedi (2005, Chap.
6, page 217) to estimate the parameters.
The duopoly multi-generation model consists of 26 parameters and in our esti-
mation routine we use 16 free parameters. This number reflects the assumptions
that the innovation and imitation coefficient, p and q, vary across firms and prod-
ucts and that the loyalty effects are symmetric. That is, we assume that φijgk is
equal to −φjikg. The τ
i
g parameters are the introduction date of each product and
we keep the real launch dates in our estimation routine.
The triopoly model consists of 45 parameters and in the estimation routine we
have 21 free parameters. This number reflects the assumptions that the p and
q parameters vary across firms, that the loyalty parameters are symmetric, and
that αi for i = x, s, n are fixed at some value. The main reduction comes from
the assumption that φijgk = −φ
ji
kg as it reduces the number of free parameters by
12. Note this is the symmetry assumption we described earlier when we discussed
Figure 1. Finally, we use the real introduction dates as values for the τ ig (g = 1, 2
and i = x, s, n) parameters.
An important assumption in the estimation routine is the value of the α pa-
rameters and we need an assumption on them. As we mentioned earlier, the α
parameter is simply the share of the sales that the first generation transfers to the
second generation. The reason why we need to make an assumption regarding α
is that there is a direct relationship between the α and the m parameters with
the realized cumulative sales. We know that the realized cumulative market sales
are fixed at some value, call it M , and it depends on both α and m. Of course,
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the realized M depends on all other parameters but specially the α and the m are
very closely related to it. If we increase α then we need a lower m to keep the
realized sales at M or if we lower α we need a higher m. This means that we can
not simultaneously identify both parameters. This is a limitation and at the same
time an advantage of our model because we can obtain the α parameter easily from
experts opinions, managers, store sales data, or surveys. All we need to know is
what percentage of the first generation sales (of an specific firm) is transferred to
its second generation and that is α. However, in case the α is not available then
we could make assumptions on the market potentials and estimate the α together
with all other free parameters in the model. We know that market potential as-
sumptions are quite common in the new products diffusion literature and they are
straightforward to construct.
In the estimation routine first we assume the α = 1 for all firms in both the
duopoly and triopoly model. Then, as an illustration, we ask an expert opinion
on the size of α for each firm in our triopoly model. We contacted a local store
manager and asked him about the α parameter of Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo
according to his experience. His information is that the α of Microsoft is 0.3, the α
of Sony is 0.1 and the α of Nintendo is 1.1. These numbers imply that Nintendo is
able to get 1.1 sold unit of Wii for each sold unit of the GameCube, Sony achieves
the lowest with a 0.1 of PS2 unit sales going into the PS3, while Microsoft is in
between with an α of 0.3.
To estimate both models we use the systems NLS estimator but due to the large
number of parameters we split estimation in three steps. First we estimate the six
innovation and imitation coefficients p and q given all other parameters fixed. Next
we estimate the loyalty coefficients φ given all other parameters are fixed at their
most recent estimated values. We iterate these two steps until convergence and
at the end of the routine we estimate the six market potentials given all other
parameters. Chintagunta et al. (2009) apply a similar estimation approach. In the
estimation routine we constrained the φ coefficients setting their lower and upper
limits at −4 and +4, respectively. However, all parameter estimates are within
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these limits as we report in Section 6. All our routines are programmed in R (R
Development Core Team, 2005).
6 Estimation Results
We report the parameter estimates for the duopoly model in Table 8. In this model
we consider two companies, Nintendo and Sony, and their portable gaming systems.
The systems are the Nintendo DS and DS Lite and the Sony PlayStation Portable
(PSP) and PSP Slim. We notice that the parameter estimates for the innovation
and imitation parameters, p and q, are lower in the multi-generation model than in
the independent Bass model reported in Table 5. In addition, the market potentials
are remarkably lower in the multi-generation model. Two factors explain the lower
estimates. First, the multi-generation model allows the first generation to transfer
a percentage α of its sales to the second generation. Hence, the second generation
market potential has a lower m estimate but note that the realized market potential
in the multi-generation model may be higher than the m estimate after adding
the competition and cannibalization effects. These results are in line with the
findings of Norton and Bass (1987) regarding the size of the market potentials of
the second generation products; see (Norton and Bass, 1987, footnote 2, page 1074).
Finally, we find significant φ parameters and this is evidence supporting the idea
that the portable systems compete against each other. For example, we see that
the Nintendo DS is losing share to the Sony PSP (see the −0.57 estimate) and
it is losing more to the second generation of Sony, the PSP Slim (see the −2.39
estimate). On the other hand, the Nintendo DS Lite is receiving a share from the
PSP Slim (see the 0.66 estimate). We report the model fit in Figure 3 and we can
see the fit is reasonably good.
In Table 9 we report the triopoly model parameter estimates with the assump-
tion that all firm’s α = 1. In Table 10 we present the parameter estimates when we
use 0.3, 0.1 and 1.1 as the α parameters for Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo, respec-
tively. Finally, in Table 11 we present the φ and α parameters reported in Table 9
in a easy to read format.
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For the triopoly case it is the q parameter estimates that are much lower than in
the Bass model reported in Table 6 while the p parameters remain very similar. An
interesting result is that the Microsoft Xbox market potential is around 19 million
units while the Xbox 360 market potential is a much lower value of 813 thousand
units. A similar drop in market potential occurs from the Sony PS2 to the Sony
PS3. The exception is Nintendo. The market potentials for both the Nintendo
GameCube and the Nintendo Wii stay around the same level (17 million units).
This finding is in line with the results of Shankar and Bayus (2003). Shankar
and Bayus (2003) analyze the video game market between 1993 and 1995 and the
two main players at that time where Nintendo and Sega. Note that in Table 3
we report the history of console releases since 1985 and that they analyzed the
last three years of the 4th generation systems. They argue that Nintendo had a
higher network strength than Sega and consequently Nintendo sales overtook those
of Sega. Recently, the Nintendo Wii is overtaking the sales of the largest player,
Sony, and our parameter estimates seem to capture this overtake.
In Table 10 we report the model with our expert’s values on the α parameters.
As we anticipated, the parameter estimates of the market potential m are higher
for the second generation of Microsoft and Sony because we assumed a much lower
α for them (0.1 and 0.3, respectively). The market potential for the Xbox360 goes
from 813 thousand units in the first model up to 2, 685 thousand units in the second,
that is 3.3 times higher. The PS3 m in the second model is 2.14 times higher than
in the first. Finally, the market potential of Nintendo’s second generation, the Wii,
is 1.161 million units lower in the second model relative to the first because of the
higher α. Surprisingly, the market potential of both generations of Nintendo are
still high relative to each other despite the fact that Nintendo can transfer more
consumers from the GameCube to the Wii (it has the highest α among the three
companies). The rest of the parameters in Table 10, with very few exceptions,
remain very close to the model parameters of Table 9. We are certain that there
are other ways to retrieve the α parameters from experts, surveys or data we stress
that this estimation exercise is just an illustration.
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In Table 11 we arrange the φ and α parameters in two six by six tables. We
numbered the estimated φ parameters in the top table and in the bottom we report
their estimates using bold face for parameters with t-values higher than 1. We
can see that the Wii is getting some share from the Xbox console (see the 2.39
parameter of the phi[4]) and that is is not competing against the PS3 (see the
−0.02 of the phi[12]). This confirms what has been argued in the press that these
two consoles are not substitutes for each other. A surprising result is that the Wii
has a positive influence on PS2 (see the −0.60 estimate of the phi[8]). The PS3 is
losing some share to the Xbox 360 and the GameCube (see the phi[6] and phi[11]
estimates) according to the sign of the parameters but they are not significant. At
the same time, the PS2 received share from the Xbox 360 and the GameCube. Most
parameter estimates are in line with our anecdotal evidence and what we read in
the press.
Finally, we plot the observed and fitted values of the triopoly model in Figure
4 and again the model fits the data reasonably well. Note that the real cumulative
sales of the first generation products, the graphs in the left of Figure 4, stabilize
after they reach their maximum. However, our model forecasts a decline in their
number of cumulative units after reaching the maximum and this is a consequence
of the substitution that takes place after new generations are introduced. Hence,
the fit after the maximum is not really the same as the fit before the maximum of
the cumulative sales given that we do not have data on substitution or un-adoption
of these products. An interesting feature of the left-hand graphs is that the foreseen
decline is faster for the Xbox and the GameCube while it is very slow for the PS2.
7 Duopoly Case Study: The Portable System Race
In this section we use our model to analyze the portable system market. We take
the duopoly model and its parameter estimates and with them we simulate four
different strategies for both Nintendo and Sony. We use a planning horizon Tp = 90
months and this number is long enough relative to the average pace of two years
we report in Table 2. Next we describe the strategies we simulate and afterwards
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we present the insights gained by our numerical exercises. At the end of the section
we present the sensitivity analysis to different parameter estimates.
7.1 Simulating Plausible Strategies
A strategy is a complete contingent plan for all market players. (Watson, 2002,
pg. 26). That is, we define the actions of Nintendo as a response to any of Sony’s
actions and viceversa. In all of the strategies, except the first, we let Nintendo be the
leader and Sony the follower. We reversed their roles in our numerical exercises and
our insights remain without significant changes. Furthermore, the leader-follower
assumption is common in the literature, see for example Bayus et al. (1997, p.
56). Finally, we assume that the order of entry does not modify the competitive
relationship between products, just as in Kamien and Schwartz (1972), but note
that we will provide sensitivity analysis to different parameter values in the next
section.
The four strategies we consider are:
1. Random Date Selection: In this strategy both Nintendo and Sony ran-
domly select a launch date for their two product generations at the beginning
of the planning horizon. That is, both firms ignore each other’s actions and
the interaction among their competing products.
2. Imitation: In this strategy Nintendo selects the launch-timing for its two
generation products and Sony imitates Nintendo. That is, Sony launches its
PS2 console at the same time as the GameCube and it launches the PS3 at
the same time as the Nintendo Wii.
3. Pre-commitment and Optimization: In this strategy Nintendo pre-commits
to the launch date of their two generation products while Sony, with perfect
foresight, optimizes the launch dates of its two generation products based on
Nintendo pre-commitment dates.
4. Uncertain Dates and Stochastic Optimization: In this strategy Nin-
tendo does not pre-commit to a launch date for its two generation products.
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However, Sony assigns a probability to each of the possible launch-timings of
the GameCube and the Wii and based on this information it optimizes the
launch-timing of the PS2 and the PS3.
We give the details of each strategy in the Appendix A. We simulate these
four strategies and we compute the outcome in terms of the maximum cumulative
sales of Sony, Nintendo and the sum of both firms’ maximum cumulative sales. We
repeat the simulation of each strategy until we cover all the combinations possible
of the launch-timing selected by Sony and Nintendo that each strategy implies. In
this way we recover the distribution of the sales that both players may achieve by
following each of the four strategies. We summarize these distributions in Table 12
and Figure 5.
In Table 12 we report six quantiles of the distribution of the sales for Sony,
Nintendo and their sum and for each of the four strategies while in Figure 5 we
plot their percentiles. The purpose of Table 12 and Figure 5 is to help us rank
the strategies in terms of the likelihood of their sales outcomes. For example, in
Table 12 we see that for Sony the sales achieved by imitating are lower than the
sales achieved by randomly selecting its dates, see the second and fourth lines in
the table.
In the right-hand side of Figure 5 we see that the strategy that results in higher
sales for Sony is the third and that is the strategy in which Sony knows the exact
launch dates of Nintendo’s products. Only at the very first percentiles (from 0 to
around 20%) the stochastic optimization strategy is better. In the graph it is clear
that the second best strategy results when Sony applies stochastic optimization. As
we can notice, this strategy puts a lower and upper limit to the sales of Sony, see the
flat areas of the uncertain dates line at the first and last percentiles. Surprisingly,
imitation is the worst strategy Sony could follow and it performs slightly worse
than when Sony randomly selects its dates.
In the left-hand side of Figure 5 we see the quantiles of the distribution of sales
achieved by Nintendo. Note that Nintendo is the leader and the outcomes are
therefore not a mirror of the results obtained by Sony. For Nintendo the results
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are mixed. We see that before the percentile 50 the best outcome is achieved when
Sony is imitating (interestingly this is not a good option for Sony) and that after the
50 percentile the best outcome is achieved by not announcing its launch dates and
by not precommiting to them (see the uncertain dates line). On the other hand,
before the 50 percentile the lowest sales are achieved when Sony uses stochastic
optimization and above the 50% the lowest sales are either random selection of
dates or pre-commitment. Note that Nintendo does not behave strategically in our
simulations. That is, Nintendo does not know that Sony is following one of the
four strategies. Given that Nintendo knows which strategy Sony is playing then it
is straightforward for Nintendo to strategically select its launch dates and achieve
high sales. This implies that if Nintendo strategically chooses its launch dates then
playing the uncertain dates strategy can result in high sales while if Nintendo acts
not strategically then pre-commitment is a reasonable strategy. Of course, we are
not using very strict criteria to rank Nintendo’s strategies but it is straightforward
to rank the strategies using different criteria given we know their corresponding
outcomes in terms of sales distributions.
7.2 Sensitivity Analysis of the Launch Strategies
The above results are sensitive to the parameter values we plug in the duopoly
model. In all previous exercises we used the values we obtained from our estimation
routine. To know how the sales outcome may change we compute the expected
value of the sales achieved by playing the second strategy (imitation) and the third
strategy (optimization) when we plug in a different set of parameter values in the
model. First we evaluate the strategy by simulating different combinations for
the phi[1] and phi[2] parameters, the phi[3] and phi[4] parameters and finally for
the phi[1] and the alpha parameter of Nintendo. The phi[1] and phi[2] are the φ
parameters between the Nintendo DS and the PSP and the PSP Slim, respectively.
The phi[3] and phi[4] are the φ parameters between the Nintendo DS Lite and the
PSP and the PSP Slim, respectively.
In Figure 6 we report the log of the ratio of the expected sales of Nintendo and
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Sony given all possible combinations of these parameters, take two at a time, for the
imitation and pre-commitment strategies. In the ratio Nintendo’s expected sales
is the numerator. This is a numerical intensive exercise in the sense that for each
parameter combination we compute all possible combinations of launch-timings
implied by each strategy and based on the outcome (in terms of their maximum
cumulative sales) we compute the expected value for the sales of both players. In
the graphs we report the log of the ratio of the expected maximum cumulative
sales between the two firms. Note that we apply the log transformation to the final
values because the log of the expected value is not the same as the expected value
of the logs.
The graphs in Figure 6 provide a unifying message. Both strategies might yield
high sales if a firm’s products are superior (in terms of the φ) parameters or if
a firm’s ability to transfer users of old technologies to new ones is high (that is
equivalent to a high alpha). If both φ parameters tend to be positive the ratio
goes up and therefore Nintendo sells more relative to Sony. The ratio increases in
a similar way when the alpha of Nintendo is higher. Earlier we concluded that the
imitation strategy is the worst among the four strategies we evaluated for Sony.
However, if Sony had superior products the imitation strategy may yield high sales,
see how the log ratio goes up to -3 and -2 in the left-most and center upper panel
graphs. This is evidence supporting Lemma 2. However, we can easily notice that
despite the unifying message the surfaces have different slopes. That is, achieving
higher sales by raising or decreasing each of the φ parameters does not yield the same
increase/decrease in expected sales. We conducted the same sensitivity analysis for
the random dates and the stochastic optimization strategies and the results are
very similar.
The main lesson of this sensitivity analysis is that the outcome of any launch-
timing strategy varies radically and it depends heavily on the competitive position-
ing of the firms’ products and on the firms’ ability to transfer users of their old
technologies to the new ones.
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8 Triopoly Case Study: The Video Game Console Race
In this section we present a different set of numerical sensitivity analyses and we will
focus on the launch-timing of the Sony PlayStation 3 and the Nintendo Wii relative
to their previous generations and relative to their competitors. In this section we
focus on answering what if questions rather than studying the strategic interaction
of firms, like in the previous subsection. We use the parameters estimates we
obtained from our estimation routine to answer the what if questions and we assume
a planning horizon Tp = 150 months. That is we assume 12.5 years as planning
horizon and this is in line with a recent interview statement of the President of Sony
Computer Entertainment in America, see Fast Company Blog (2009). In addition,
we illustrate the sensitivity of the optimal launch-timing to different competitive
and cannibalization parameters.
In Table 3 we reported the release dates of all major video game systems. It
easy to notice that historically the phenomena of a launch race in a single year is
relatively a recent experience for system manufacturers. This is interesting given
that the number of systems manufacturers has stayed relatively constant since
the early nineties. We observed for example that the Nintendo Wii was launched
at the same time as the PlayStation 3 in North America three years ago. The
GameCube and the Xbox were launched simultaneously in 2001. The other close to
simultaneous launch cases occurred between the Wii and PS3 in Japan and between
the Xbox and GameCube in Europe in 2006 and 2002, respectively. The average
timing between releases is approximately five years (5.09 years), and the standard
deviation of this average is almost one year (0.90 years), see Table 4. Hence, we
believe that there is a need for insights about whether these launch-timing were
chosen optimally or what could make them optimal.
The optimization situations that we consider next are much simpler than the
optimization situations that we encounter in practice. They are simpler because
of mainly two reasons. First, we do not consider the strategic interaction between
firms as in previous section. Second, we do not consider price as part of the opti-
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mization problem because we focus on analyzing the launch-timing decision relative
to different cannibalization and competitive settings. However, the timing decision
can be considered as a sub-game of the price and timing game. That is, our analysis
has no assumption regarding the price of the consoles and we focus on the effects
of timing dates on the unit sales of the systems. This assumption is in line with
similar studies to ours, see for example Joshi et al. (2009) and the work cited by
(Souza et al., 2004, p. 538) regarding pricing assumptions. However, we do not
consider this a very strong assumption in terms of our model estimation because of
the cleaning procedure of our data. Nonetheless, if we had a reasonable assumption
about the price for all six systems in our triopoly or duopoly model, and how the
prices of all systems are strategically related to each other, then it is straightfor-
ward to introduce it in the optimization problem. Still, our results will be valid as
price would possibly work as a discounting factor in the optimization problem. Of
course, the effect of price on demand is not a straightforward introduction into our
diffusion model and we consider this an area of further research.
8.1 Simulating What If Questions
The first what if question we answer is: What would be the maximum cumulative
sales of the Nintendo and Sony if they would have launched their consoles at dif-
ferent dates and leaving everything else constant? That is, we answer how either
the sum of the maximum of equation (12) and (13) for Sony and the sum of the
maximum of equation (14) and (15) for Nintendo are maximized. In Figure 7 we
plot the total sales of Nintendo (summing up the maximum cumulative sales of the
Wii and the GameCube) achieved by launching at different dates. The maximum
cumulative sales are reached when the Wii is launched at the month 64 (that is
April 2005) and the GameCube at month 1 (January 2000). That is 5.33 years
between their releases. The real release time between these two consoles was 5.01
years in North America, 5.22 years in Japan and 4.60 in Europe. The real launch
dates happened at November 2006 (month 83 in the graph) and November 2001
(month 23 in the graph). Surprisingly, Nintendo is not launching that far from the
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optimal dates and according to this surface the difference of sales between real and
optimal dates is 3, 858.62 thousand units (66, 431.66 thousand units at the optimal
and 62, 573.04 at their real launch dates). The story is different for Sony. In Figure
8 the maximum is reached when the PS2 is launched at month 1 (January 2000)
and with the PS3 not launched. Note that setting the month of launch equal to
the end of the planning horizon is equivalent to not launching. This is a radical
scenario but it is explained by the fact that the PS2 is receiving sales from both the
Xbox 360 and the Nintendo Wii according to our model estimates while the PS3
competitive parameters are not very favorable, see Table 11. The real launch dates
of the PS2 and PS3 are the months 10 (October, 2000) and 84 (December, 2006),
respectively. The total sales of Sony at these last pair of dates is 59.988 million
units, in Figure 8 all the sales surface is graphed for all possible launch dates. We
know that up to the first week of August 2009 the PS2 has sold 50.767 million units
(source vgchartz.com). Hence according to our model the realized sales of PS3 will
be around 9.22 (±2.14) million units while up to date the Sony PS3 has sold 9.018
million units. The 2.14 million units is the average derivative of the surface at the
real launch dates, the point (10, 84) in Figure 8. Therefore, our model is not very
optimistic about the PS3.
The next questions we answer are: what is the optimal launch time of the
Nintendo Wii given the launch times of the Sony PS3? and what is the optimal time
of the Sony PS3 given the launch times of the Wii? We can answer these questions
by looking at Figure 9. In this figure we present two contour graphs (or heat
maps). The lighter (yellow) areas represent higher total sales and the darker (red)
areas represent lower sales. We call these graphs sales reaction surfaces because
we can derive the best reaction function of either Nintendo or Sony given each
other introduction timings. A reaction function maps any launch-timing of a firm
to the best launch-timing of a second firm. We use the same definition of reaction
functions as in Section 7. For example, in the left-hand graph we see that the
maximum of Nintendo’s sales is on month 73 given Sony launched its PS3 in month
1. From Table 11 we know that the PS3 and the Wii are not close competitors and
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not surprisingly the optimal launch date of the Wii given any introduction date of
the PS3 remains close to the month 73 (January 2006) for any introduction timing
of the PS3. What is surprising is that Nintendo launched 11 months later than its
optimal timing. In the right-hand graph we see that the optimal launch dates of
Sony are not very sensitive to those of the Nintendo Wii. For example, if the Wii
were launched from month 1 up to the month 60 (that is from January 2000 up
to December 2004) then the optimal month for the PS3 remains very close to the
month 126 (June 2010). However, if the Wii is launched after the month 80 then
the optimal action for Sony is to set the introduction date of the PS3 at month
150, the end of the planning horizon. Hence, the best strategy for Sony if the Wii
is launched after month 80, is not to launch the PS3.
8.2 Sensitivity Analysis of the Optimal Launch-Timing
In the previous subsection we answered what if questions assuming our model
parameter values are the ones resulting from the estimation routine. However, the
optimal timing is sensitive to the parameter values and in this subsection we present
how sensitive it is to different competitive and cannibalization settings.
First we present the sensitivity of the optimal launch date of the Sony PS3 to the
competitive parameters that relate this console to the Xbox 360 and the Wii, the
phi[6] and phi[12] respectively, for six different scenarios. In each of these scenarios
we assume an early, a late, and an intermediate introduction timing of the Xbox 360
and the Wii. That is, we present three scenarios for each last generation console that
competes against the PS3. Second, we present the sensitivity of the optimal launch
date of the Sony PS3 given different cannibalization and competitive parameters
using these same six possible scenarios. We present these results in Figure 10 and
Figure 11 respectively.
In Figure 10 we present the scenarios for early (month 40), intermediate (month
84) and late (month 120) introduction timings of the Microsoft Xbox 360 at the
upper graphs. In the graphs at the bottom we present the scenarios with the
Nintendo Wii launched at the same set of introduction timings. For all six scenarios
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we leave all other introduction timings and parameters at their real or estimated
values, respectively. Note that we only use the φ parameters that relate the three
systems in our scenarios and set the others at their estimated values.
The first lesson we derive from Figure 10 is that the optimal timing of the PS3
depends on how it is competitively related to its two main competitors and not to
only one of them. The second insight is that there is a parameter space for which it
is better not to launch the PS3 (that is the flat top area in all graphs). Therefore, we
can visualize the parameter space where Lemma 3 holds, these are the flat top don’t
launch areas in Figure 10. Hence, the launch never might be optimal depending
on the competitive positioning of the PS3. Similarly, there is a parameter space for
which there are earlier optimal introduction timings for the PS3. The third insight
is that, the parameter space that is suitable for an earlier introduction gets reduced
when the competing consoles are launched at later stages. See how the flat surface
(the don’t launch area) is larger for the center and right graphs relative to the left
most graph. The fourth insight is that even when the competitive parameters are
very favorable for the Sony PS3, its earliest optimal introduction timing happens
at the month 60 (December 2004) and that would imply a 4.16 years difference
between the PS2 and the PS3. That is, the launch now solution is not part of
a very favorable set of parameter values. Note that this time difference between
consoles is on the low side of the time between actual releases for all the major
video game systems reported in Table 4.
This last result may point that the 4 year time between releases could be a
good introduction pacing strategy when the product is superior relative to its com-
petitors. Interestingly, the time between releases are in the low side for third and
fourth generation consoles and they are in the high side for the the six and seventh
generation systems. We do not have data on the earlier systems but our intuition is
that the fourth generation consoles were superior to the third generation consoles
and they were better positioned relative to its competitors. This may be the case,
for example, of the Sega Genesis and the Sega Dreamcast launched 4.33 and 3.25
years after their previous generation, respectively. According to our discussions
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with some hard-core gamers that seems to have been the case indeed. In contrast,
we have read in the press that the relative positioning of the Sony PS3 and the
Xbox 360, for example, is not very strong relative to each other and this coincides
both with longer time between releases diagnosed by our model and with the longer
time between releases we document in Table 4 for the latest product generations.
In Figure 11 we present the sensitivity analysis of the optimal launch-timing of
the PS3 to different cannibalization and competitive parameters, that is concerning
the α and φ parameters. The upper graphs show the optimal timing of the PS3 for
three scenarios of the launch-timing of the Xbox 360, similar as previous graphs. In
the bottom graphs we present the scenarios with different introduction timings of
the Nintendo Wii. The main difference between this and the previous figure is that
one of the axis is now replaced by Sony’s alpha. In the upper graphs we consider
the cannibalization parameter of Sony and the φ parameter (phi[6]) that relates
the Xbox 360 and the PS3. In the bottom graphs we use the same cannibalization
parameter of Sony and the φ parameter that relates the Wii and the PS3, the
phi[12]. The range we use for the α cannibalization goes from 0 up to 3. A higher
number than 1 would imply that Sony is able to get more than one unit sale of the
PS3 for each PS2 sold.
The first insight we derive from Figure 11 is that the optimal introduction timing
of the PS3 depends on both the relative positioning to its competitors and to the
cannibalization between Sony’s generations. The second insight is that, as before,
there is a parameter space for which it is optimal not to launch the PS3 (the top
flat don’t launch areas) and this space seems larger when competitors launch their
consoles at late introduction dates. The third new insight is that the larger Sony’s
α is, the sooner it is optimal to introduce the PS3. If there is little cannibalization,
for example for α values between 0 and 0.5, then it is optimal for Sony to set the
launch-timing of the PS3 closer to the end of the planning horizon. For example, in
the leftmost bottom graph the optimal timing for a low α values ranges between the
month 100 (April 2008) and 129 (January 2010), when the phi[12] value is equal to
2. However, if the α value is larger (near 3 in the same graph) the optimal timing
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stabilizes at 81 (September 2006). The middle bottom graph corresponds to the
scenario that considers the real introduction date for the Wii and in this graph the
optimal timing stabilizes at month 65 (May 2005) when both the phi[12] and the α
parameter are very favorable to Sony. The optimal timing stabilizes in all graphs
around the month 64 (April 2005) and this month implies 4.5 years between releases.
Therefore, the launch now strategy is not a result of very favorable competitive and
alpha parameters. The real launch of the PS3 occurred in month 84 and this month
is optimal only when the α is much larger than 1 and with a phi[12] approximately
near 1. This may indicate that Sony’s management might have been very optimistic
about the PS3 when they chose that month, at least according to our model.
Finally, the last insight is that when there is no cannibalization the optimal
timing of the PS3 is at time 0, that is the launch now strategy is covered only as a
special case when there is no cannibalization between generations, (Lemma 1). In
all the graphs of Figure 11 we can see that the don’t launch area does not reach
the α = 0 and at this parameter value the optimal timing drops rapidly to the very
start of the planning horizon. See the little empty space between the don’t launch
area and the back wall in all graphs. Visually, it is easier to detect how the surface
drops to zero in the upper graphs.
To summarize, the launch now strategy results only when there is no cannibal-
ization between a firm’s product while the launch never strategy results when there
are late product introductions by competitors, when a firm’s alpha is very low, or
when the competition is intense in terms of the φ parameters. In addition, we find
that very favorable competitive and alpha parameters do not imply the launch now
strategy as we discovered that the optimal launch-timing seems to reach a limit
of 4 years between generations. Finally, we find that the higher a firm’s ability to
transfer its old technologies users to the new ones, the earlier it is optimal for it to
introduce new generation products.
36
9 Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper we presented a new model that is helpful to analyze different launch-
timing strategies and optimal introduction timings. It is straightforward to estimate
the model parameters and to analyze different interesting competitive and firms’
alpha scenarios. Our model is suitable to study settings where there are just a few
market players or products and when there are some dominant alpha technologies
in the market.
The insights we gained is that the launch now or never strategies may arise
depending on the competitive parameters and the relationship between the products
in the market. Specifically, the launch now or never strategies arise when there are
late product introductions by competitors, when a firm’s alpha is very low, or when
competition is intense.
For the first time in the academic literature we provide some insights into the
introduction strategy of the main players in the studied industry and we document
their introductions since the late eighties. We find that the launch strategy of each
4 years seems appropriate when there is a better product positioning or very high
alphas. That seemed to be the case at the early stages of the game systems industry
while it is not any more so now.
According to our model, Nintendo launched the Wii at an appropriate moment
while the Sony PS3 perhaps should have never been launched. Moreover, we find
that different strategic interactions between firms lead to different sales levels and
we argue that the strategy should be chosen relative to the firms’ alpha and rela-
tive to the competitive setting that its products face. For example, the imitation
strategy returns are higher for certain competitive parameters, specifically when
the product is superior.
The managerial implications are clear. According to our insights the managers
in industries with alpha technologies should pay not only attention to the com-
petition but also to the ability of their firms to transfer users of old technologies
to new ones. In our case study we pointed out that the outlook for PS3 is not
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very promising, it may reach maximum a 12 million unit sales according to our
estimates. However, if Sony’s managers work in new ways to increase Sony’s alpha
or its competitive positioning the outlook for the PS3 could improve.
The higher a firm’s ability to transfer its old technologies users to the new ones,
the earlier it is optimal for it to introduce new generation products. Think of the
situation where the first generation product of a firm may face stiff competition
after a point in time while its second generation is better equipped to fight against
the new entrant. In this scenario, the best and perhaps the only surviving strategy
would be to transfer its users of old technologies to the new ones as soon as possible
and before competitive entry. We speculate then that the ability to survive in such
market depends partially but heavily on the firm’s alphas.
In our view, the technology markets mimic some of the competitive behavior of
the alpha chimpanzees. The alpha rank for a chimpanzee means access to desirable
foods, females or resting places while for companies the alpha rank means access
to the users of their own old technologies. However, note that in the paper we
assumed non-cooperative behavior between firms while it has been documented that
alpha males in the chimpanzee society may form temporal alliances to overcome
the current dominant alpha male (Nishida, 1983). This is a situation we do not
study and that we may encounter in the future of the game systems markets. For
example, the recent search alliance between Yahoo and Microsoft and the alliance
between Toshiba and Sony regarding the blu-ray standard seem to be in line with
the cooperative behavior of chimpanzees reported by Nishida (1983). On the other
hand, the potential entrance of Apple and Microsoft in the portable gaming systems
market points towards the arrival of more alpha technologies and hence perhaps
more competition. Finally, we left out other aspects of the marketing mix that may
prove important in the timing of new dominant technologies. We consider all these
extensions interesting avenues for further research.
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10 Tables and Figures
Firm Portable System North America Japan Europe
Nintendo DS Lite June 11, 2006 March 2, 2006 June 23, 2006
DS November 21, 2004 December 2, 2004 March 11, 2005
GameBoy Advance SP February 15, 2003 February 14, 2003 March 28, 2003
GameBoy Advance June 11, 2001 March 21, 2001 June 22, 2001
GameBoy Color November 19, 1998 October 21, 1998 November 23, 1998
GameBoy August 15, 1989 April 21, 1989 1990
Sony PSP Slim Lite September 5, 2007 September 13, 2007 September 5, 2007
PSP March 24, 2005 December 12, 2004 September 1, 2005
Source: VGchartz, Wikipedia & online press articles. Notes: We report the year of introduction when the
exact date is not available.
Table 1: Release Dates of Portable Systems
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Firm Transition to/from North America Japan Europe
Nintendo DS - DSLite 1.55 1.25 1.28
GBA SP - DS 1.77 1.80 1.96
GBA - GBA SP 1.68 1.90 1.76
GBC - GBA 2.56 2.42 2.58
GB - GBC 9.27 9.51 –
Sony PSP Slim - PSP 2.45 2.75 2.01
Table 2: Release Time Between Portable Systems (in Years)
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Generation Firm Console North America Japan Europe
7th generation Nintendo Wii November 19, 2006 December 2, 2006 December 8, 2006
Sony PlayStation 3 November 17, 2006 November 11, 2006 March 23, 2007
Microsoft Xbox 360 November 22, 2005 December 10, 2005 December 2, 2005
6th generation Nintendo GameCube November 18, 2001 September 14, 2001 May 3, 2002
Sony PlayStation 2 October 26, 2000 March 4, 2000 November 24, 2000
Microsoft Xbox November 15, 2001 February 22, 2002 March 14, 2002
Sega Dreamcast September 9, 1999 November 27, 1998 October 14, 1999
5th generation Nintendo N64 September 29, 1996 June 29, 1996 March 1, 1997
Sony PlayStation September 9, 1995 December 3, 1994 September 29, 1995
Sega Saturn May 11, 1995 November 22, 1994 July 8, 1995
Atari Jaguar November 18, 1993 – –
4th generation Nintendo Super Nintendo August 13, 1991 November 21, 1990 April 11, 1992
Sega Genesis September 15, 1989 October 29, 1988 November 30, 1990
3rd generation Nintendo Nintendo October 18, 1985 July 15, 1983 –
Sega Master System June 15, 1986 1985 1987
Source: VGChartz, Wikipedia & online press articles. Notes: We report the year of introduction when the exact date is
not available.
Table 3: Release Dates of Major Video Game Consoles
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Firm Transition to/from North America Japan Europe
Nintendo Wii - GameCube 5.01 5.22 4.60
GameCube -N64 5.14 5.21 5.18
N64 - SNES 5.13 5.61 4.89
SNES - Nintendo 5.82 7.36 –
Sony PS3 - PS2 6.06 6.69 6.33
PS2 - PS1 5.13 5.25 5.16
Microsoft Xbox 360 - Xbox 4.02 3.80 3.72
Sega Dreamcast - Saturn 4.33 4.02 4.27
Saturn - Genesis 5.65 6.07 4.61
Genesis - Master Sys 3.25 – –
Table 4: Time Between Major VGC Releases (in years).
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Video Game Console m (thousand units) p q Sample
Nintendo DS 6799.3447** 0.0140** 0.1789** Nov 2004 - June 08
(1975.3660) (0.0056) (0.0543)
Nintendo DS Lite 27972.9479** 0.0403** 1.9922** June 2006 - Jan 2009
(1130.8544) (0.0146) (0.2999)
PSP 9717.9772** 0.0109** 0.1500** Mar 2005 - Sep 2007
(1525.7210) (0.0026) (0.0389)
PSP Slim Lite 7068.5424** 0.0184* 0.2449* Sep 2007 - Jan 2009
(2579.1973) (0.0091) (0.1168)
Note: standard error in parentheses; *,** mean that the coefficient is significant with 95% and 99% confidence respectively
Table 5: Bass Model Estimates for Portable Systems
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Video Game Console m p q Sample
Xbox 16157.4500** 0.0058** 0.0993** Nov 2001 - Aug 2007
(699.5485) (0.0009) (0.0132)
Xbox 360 16312.2600** 0.0054** 0.1272** Nov 2005 - Jan 2009
(2826.5520) (0.0012) (0.0304)
PlayStation2 47847.1300** 0.0037** 0.0619** Oct 2000 - Jan 2009
(4520.1510) (0.0007) (0.0149)
PlayStation3 8190.0120** 0.0075** 0.1789** Nov 2006 - Jan 2009
(1173.5730) (0.0014) (0.0333)
GameCube 12716.7600** 0.0058** 0.0959** Nov 2001 - Apr 2008
(527.1293) (0.0009) (0.0142)
Wii 23353.9300** 0.0063** 0.1672** Nov 2006 - Jan 2009
(4673.3370) (0.0014) (0.0340)
Note: standard error in parentheses; ** mean that coefficients are significant with 99% confidence.
Table 6: Bass Model Estimates for Video Game Consoles
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System Model Lags % Network Effects
Nintendo GameCube 4 15.77%
Nintendo Wii 11 23.33%
Sony PlayStation2 – –
Sony PlayStation3 5 2.28%
Microsoft Xbox 3 3.60%
Microsoft Xbox 360 7 6.69%
Nintendo DS 14 37.24%
Sony PSP 9 2.28%
All Systems 7.57 13.03%
Table 7: Video Game Effects on Game Systems
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Coefficient System Estimate s.e. t-value
p DS 0.01189 (0.0018) 6.56
DS Lite 0.03243 (0.0040) 8.12
PSP 0.05556 (0.0106) 5.25
PSP Slim 0.02843 (0.0076) 3.74
q DS 0.07897 (0.0406) 1.94
DS Lite 0.08174 (0.0353) 2.31
PSP -0.08717 (0.0918) -0.95
PSP Slim 0.12453 (0.0358) 3.48
phis (1) -0.57882 (0.6478) -0.89
(2) -2.39516 (1.9112) -1.25
(3) -0.41831 (0.2109) -1.98
(4) 0.66457 (0.2196) 3.03
m DS 15991.8 (530.0378) 30.17
DS Lite 10980.7 (486.4696) 22.57
PSP 10498.0 (169.4519) 61.95
PSP Slim 1012.0 (205.1027) 4.93
Note: phis (1) is the substitution coefficient between DS and PSP, phi(2)
between DS and PSP Slim, phi(3) between DS Lite and PSP, and phi(4)
between DS Lite and PSP Slim; s.e. stands for standard error.
Table 8: Multi-Generation Model for Portable Systems
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Coefficient Console Estimate s.e. t-value
p Microsoft 0.00943 (0.0025) 3.79
Sony 0.00980 (0.0011) 8.56
Nintendo 0.01156 (0.0021) 5.63
q Microsoft 0.06115 (0.0143) 4.27
Sony 0.03881 (0.0051) 7.55
Nintendo 0.05381 (0.0144) 3.74
phis [1] -0.00512 (0.2087) -0.02
[2] -0.07195 (0.8990) -0.08
[3] 0.02003 (0.2270) 0.09
[4] -2.39045 (1.0587) -2.26
[5] -0.28843 (0.1261) -2.29
[6] 0.31218 (0.8135) 0.38
[7] 0.62241 (0.2734) 2.28
[8] -0.20223 (0.6419) -0.32
[9] 0.11293 (0.2238) 0.50
[10] 0.60116 (0.1576) 3.81
[11] -0.42376 (0.5037) -0.84
[12] 0.02402 (0.9240) 0.03
m Xbox 19135.29 (1132.2) 16.90
Xbox 360 813.10 (1884.7) 0.43
PS2 41135.91 (848.8) 48.46
PS3 987.54 (6416.3) 0.15
GameCube 16382.92 (1194.1) 13.72
Wii 17385.63 (2029.2) 8.57
Notes: m is in thousand units
Table 9: Multi-Generation Model for Video Game Consoles (Microsoft α = 1, Sony α = 1,
Nintendo α = 1)
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Coefficient Console Estimate s.e. t-value
p Microsoft 0.01220 (0.0043) 2.82
Sony 0.01142 (0.0021) 5.49
Nintendo 0.00809 (0.0016) 5.06
q Microsoft 0.05423 (0.0201) 2.69
Sony 0.03216 (0.0078) 4.13
Nintendo 0.06670 (0.0151) 4.43
phis [1] -0.09294 (0.2166) -0.43
[2] -2.13156 (1.5318) -1.39
[3] 0.04654 (0.2377) 0.20
[4] -3.08154 (1.6084) -1.92
[5] 0.13089 (0.1357) 0.96
[6] 0.40535 (0.5606) 0.72
[7] 0.90676 (0.2681) 3.38
[8] 0.37551 (0.5191) 0.72
[9] 0.09675 (0.2246) 0.43
[10] 0.43943 (0.2651) 1.66
[11] 0.36342 (0.7003) 0.52
[12] 0.15694 (1.0118) 0.16
m Xbox 18908.97 (1346.3) 14.05
Xbox 360 2685.35 (874.9) 3.07
PS2 40409.41 (1002.8) 40.30
PS3 2117.23 (1142.5) 1.85
GameCube 17665.16 (1570.8) 11.25
Wii 16224.15 (2706.9) 5.99
Notes: m is in thousand units
Table 10: Multi-Generation Model for Video Game Consoles (Microsoft α = 0.3, Sony
α = 0.1, Nintendo α = 1.1)
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Xbox X360 PS2 PS3 GC Wii
Xbox x -1 [1] [2] [3] [4]
X360 1 x [5] [6] [7] [8]
PS2 -[1] -[5] x -1 [9] [10]
PS3 -[2] -[6] 1 x [11] [12]
GC -[3] -[7] -[9] -[11] x -1
Wii -[4] -[8] -[10] -[12] 1 x
Xbox x -1 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 -2.39
X360 1 x -0.29 0.31 0.62 -0.20
PS2 0.01 0.29 x -1 0.11 0.60
PS3 0.07 -0.31 1 x -0.42 0.02
GC -0.02 -0.62 -0.11 0.42 x -1
Wii 2.39 0.20 -0.60 -0.02 1 x
Notes: the numbers between brackets represent the phi coeffi-
cients of the multi-generation model reported in table 9. The
bold coefficients have t-values greater than 1.
Table 11: Competitive Parameters
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Strategy Player / Quantile 1% 5% 10% 50% 90% 95% 99%
[1] Random Selection of Dates Nintendo 1681.4 6538.5 10933.5 26369.6 39146.8 42941.3 48084.3
Sony 1550.5 2528.4 3890.3 10398.8 19962.5 23481.8 29284.3
Total 13833.1 21187.1 26621.7 45590.7 57653.5 59676.6 62545.3
[2] Pre-commitment / Imitation Nintendo 3769.5 9998.8 13288.1 28553.4 37470.9 39509.4 41273.4
Sony 724.0 1431.3 2383.7 9415.3 18372.8 19513.3 20362.9
Total 7324.8 15961.7 19174.6 38146.2 54316.4 57663.5 60415.2
[3] Pre-commitment / Optimization* Nintendo 1543.9 4696.4 8540.6 28837.4 35805.5 36944.6 38842.0
Sony 13890.7 15387.0 16973.4 21908.2 31948.0 33108.3 34149.6
Total 17887.0 25253.3 30900.2 52132.8 60307.6 62785.7 65845.1
[5] Uncertain Launch Dates / Optimization** Nintendo 1548.9 3834.1 6769.8 28615.2 36868.9 38215.9 39742.1
Sony 13285.2 13873.2 14441.2 20579.3 30961.4 31846.6 32695.6
Total 17335.7 24765.2 30434.0 48845.5 59968.6 62956.7 66081.8
Notes: * Nintendo pre-commits to a date while Sony optimizes its launch dates given Nintendo pre-commitment dates.** Nintendo does not
pre-commits to any date and Sony optimize given the probability that Nintendo launch at any date.
Table 12: Evaluation of Four Launch Strategies
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Figure 6: Strategy Sales Sensitivity to Competitive Parameters
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Figure 10: Sony PS3 Optimal Launch-Timing Sensitivity to Competitive Parameters
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Figure 11: Sony PS3 Optimal Launch-Timing Sensitivity to Cannibalization and Competitive Parameters
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A Strategy Evaluation
In this section we provide the details of each of the four strategies we use in our
application.
A.1 Random Date Selection
In this strategy firm 1 selects τ11 and τ
1
2 randomly and firm 2 selects τ
2
1 and τ
2
2 in
the same way. We discretize the planning horizon in Tp periods. Hence the possible
launch dates τ gi (where i stands for firm i while g stands for the system generation)
might be at any t within t = 1, . . . , Tp; we denote the length of the planning horizon
p. We consider a 90 month planning horizon that is 7.5 years. This time frame is
long enough given the average life-cycle of the portable systems is 2.5 years. With
this planning horizon we evaluate the maximum of the cumulative sales for each
system of both firms given all the feasible launch dates τ gi for i = 1, 2 and g = 1, 2.
That is, firm 1 might select one out of the p2 possible launch-timings but we restrict
the combinations to the set where τ2i ≥ τ
1
i . This means that we restrict that the
second generation product for both firms is launched at a date either at the same
time or after the first generation. The feasible set reduces from p2 to (p+ 1)× p/2
feasible combinations for each player. Note that we use Tp = 90 and we set p = 45.
In the duopoly case i = 1 refers to Nintendo and i = 2 refers to Sony.
We evaluate equations (3) to (6) with the feasible set of launch-timing and we
compute the maximum cumulative sales achieved by each product generation for
both firms. That is we compute max(SSonyg (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 )) for g = 1, 2
and max(SNing (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 )) for g = 1, 2. The g = 1 product of Sony
is the Sony PSP and the g = 2 product of Sony is PSP Slim; for Nintendo the
g = 1 product is the DS and the g = 2 product is the DS Lite. In table 12
we report the quantiles of the total sales of Sony achieved by this strategy, that is∑
gmax(S
Sony
g (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 )) and
∑
gmax(S
Nin
g (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 ))
and the total sales of both players (the sum of the last two terms).
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A.2 Imitation
In this strategy firm 1 pre-commits to a launch-timing for its two product genera-
tions while firm 2 imitates the launch-timing of firm 1. That is, both firms launch
at the same time each of their product generations. In our application we set Nin-
tendo the be the firm that pre-commits to a certain launch date and Sony to be the
firm that imitates. We assume that Nintendo pre-commits to a randomly chosen
pair of dates τNin1 and τ
Nin
2 and Sony sets τ
Sony
1 = τ
Nin
1 and τ
Sony
2 = τ
Nin
2 . In this
strategy we assume Nintendo ignores that Sony will imitate and we do not assume
Nintendo might pre-commit strategically to the best pair of dates. However, it is
straightforward to identify the best pre-commitment dates of Nintendo given Sony
is imitating.
A.3 Pre-commitment and Optimization
In this strategy firm 1 pre-commits to a launch-timing for its two product genera-
tions while firm 2 optimizes its launch-timings given the launch dates of firm 1. As
before, we set Nintendo the be the firm that pre-commits to a certain launch date
and Sony to be the firm that optimizes. We assume that Nintendo pre-commits to
a randomly chosen pair of dates τNin1 and τ
Nin
2 and Sony sets τ
Sony
1 and τ
Sony
2 such
that
∑
g max(S
Sony
g (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 )) is maximized. In this strategy we as-
sume Nintendo ignores that Sony will optimize and we do not assume Nintendo
might pre-commit strategically to the best pair of dates. However, it is straightfor-
ward to identify the equilibrium if both firms are optimizing. Finally, we note that
pre-commitment and perfect foresight are usual assumptions in the literature, for
examples see Reinganum (1981) and Bayus et al. (1997).
A.4 Uncertain Launch Dates and Stochastic Optimization
In this strategy firm 1 selects a pair of launch dates for its two generation products
but does not reveal these dates to firm 2. However, we assume firm 2 can derive
the best response of firm 1 given any pair of dates assigned by firm 2 to its own
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products. That is, firm 2 has knowledge on the reaction function of firm 1 however
firm 2 does not know which date launch will be picked for certain by firm 1. The
reaction function is a function that maps any launch-timing of firm 2 to the best
launch-timing of firm 1. In our application, the best reaction function of Nintendo
f(τSony1 , τ
Sony
2 ) = Ω
(
max
τNin1 ,τ
Nin
2
(
∑
g
SNing (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 ))
)
(23)
Ω() returns a pair of dates τNin1 and τ
Nin
2 that maximize the sales of Nintendo given
the launch dates of Sony (τSony1 and τ
Sony
2 ). We further assume that firm 2 assigns
a probability that firm 1 will launch on dates τ11 and τ
1
2 proportional to the sales
achieved by selecting these two dates. That is,
p(τNin1 , τ
Nin
2 ) =
∑
gmax(S
Nin
g (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 ))∑
(τNin1 ,τ
Nin
2 )∈f(τ
Sony
1 ,τ
Sony
2 )
∑
gmax(S
Nin
g (τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 |τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 ))
(24)
Note that τ11 and τ
1
2 should belong to the set of dates given by the reaction func-
tion of firm 1 and that is why they should be contained in the reaction function
f(τSony1 , τ
Sony
2 ); otherwise the strategy is not considered. Given these assumptions
the strategy of firm 2 is to select the pair of launch dates that maximize its expected
sales. The best reaction function of Sony is
f(τNin1 , τ
Nin
2 ) = Ω
(
max
τ
Sony
1 ,τ
Sony
2
(
∑
g
SSonyg (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 ))
)
(25)
and hence Sony selects τSony1 and τ
Sony
2 such that
p(τNin1 , τ
Nin
2 )×
∑
g
max(SSonyg (τ
Sony
1 , τ
Sony
2 |τ
Nin
1 , τ
Nin
2 ))(τSony1 ,τ
Sony
2 )∈f(τ
Nin
1 ,τ
Nin
2 )
(26)
is maximized.
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